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COMMENTS
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTEXT: A UNIFIED METHOD OF ANALYSIS
State regulatory legislation is frequently subject to invalidation
by federal judges applying the doctrine of preemption.' The pre-
emption doctrine invalidates state legislation when it conflicts 2 or
is incompatible with 3 the legitimate exercise of federal authority.
The Supreme Court's application of preemption standards has fluc-
tuated unpredictably over the last three decades. 4 Uncertainty as
to the manner in which the federal judiciary will apply the doctrine
precludes state legislators from enacting legislation that will pro-
vide optimal protection of state interests while not encroaching on
significant federal interests.
State legislation enacted for the purpose of environmental pro-
tection is particularly susceptible to the challenge that the exercise
of state authority has encroached on federal interests. Erratic appli-
cation of preemption standards in general 5 has led to inconsistent
results in this area.6 Such inconsistency and uncertainty frustrate
both state and national environmental policy.
'E.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast
Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977);
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Northern
States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405
U.S. 1035 (1972).
2 See text accompanying notes 29-43 infra.
3 See text accompanying notes 44-55 infra.
4 See Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Preemption Doctrine,
4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives, 75 CoLUm. L. REv. 623, 624 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Shifting Per-
spectives] (Supreme Court's erratic approach to preemption challenges has an
"unprincipled quality, seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis."); Note,
Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L.
RBv. 208 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Preferential Ground].
S Compare Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117
(1973) and New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) with
Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) and Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
6 Compare Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972)
with Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Palladio
Inc. v. Diamond, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971); A.E.
Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625, 264 N.E.2d 118
(1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Reptile Prod. Ass'n, Inc. v. Diamond, 401 U.S.
969 (1971).
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This Comment proposes a new method of analyzing preemption
challenges to state environmental legislation. The purpose of this
proposed method is to enable the judiciary rationally and coherently
to dispose of environmental preemption challenges, and thereby to
clarify the boundaries of legitimate state environmental regulation
that is more stringent than federal legislation. The method requires
inquiry not only into congressional intent, but also into the ramifi-
cations of the state legislation in fields in which federal interests are
exclusive or dominant.7 In close cases federal interests and costs
will have to be weighed against state interests and costs to determine
whether state regulation is preempted; but in most cases it will be
presumed that state environmental standards more stringent than
their federal counterparts will be held not preempted.8 In order
to illustrate the utility of the proposed method, the Comment will
use it to analyze the recent case Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Com-
pany.9 The new method will be applied to the facts of Ray and
7 Most courts and commentators have articulated the principle that a preemp-
tion challenge may be disposed of by inquiring only into whether Congress con-
sciously intended to occupy the specific area affected by state legislation. E.g.,
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 229-30 (1947); Shifting Perspectives, supra note 4, at 624 n.7. This position,
however, fails to consider those situations in which state legislation is "preempted"
by federal authority which, though not necessarily exercised in the form of enacted
federal legislation, exists as a result of national sovereignty and the division of powers
between state and federal governments. When the implementation of state legis-
lation intrudes into an area such as foreign affairs or interstate commerce, which is
entrusted by the Constitution to the control of either Congress or the President, such
legislation is "preempted" by the actual or potential exercise of federal authority.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436, 440 (1968); Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines,
Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954). See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept
of Preemption, 21 DEPAUL L. lEv. 630 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Dynamic
Federalism].
A comprehensive preemption analysis must consider not only congressional in-
tent to supersede state legislation and the narrow purposes motivating the enactment
of a specific piece of federal legislation, but also the effect state legislation has on
significant federal interests. Although traditional interpretations of preemption
doctrine have focused on whether Congress intended to exercise authority in an
exclusive manner, logic and Zschernig would suggest that a state regulatory scheme
should be held preempted if it directly or indirectly hinders the federal govern-
ment's ability to exercise sovereign authority. See text accompanying notes 12-22
in fra.
For discussions of judicial doctrines dealing with the division of authority be-
tween state and federal governments, see generally Friendly, Federalism: A Fore-
word, 86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977); Dynamic Federalism, supra; Shifting Perspectives,
supra note 4; Preferential Ground, supra note 4.
For a discussion of the allocation of authority in the environmental context
between the states and the federal government, see Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environ-
mental Policy, 86 YAix L.J. 1196 (1977).
8 See text accompanying notes 103-04 infra.
9 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
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contrasted with the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case.10 Al-
though this Comment focuses primarily on the environmental field,
it should be added that the method of analysis proposed herein
could usefully be applied to other regulatory fields provided that
the character of federal-state relations in each field is taken into
account.
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. Preemption Based on Exclusive Federal
Authority and the Supremacy Clause
The various principles traditionally employed in preemption
analysis have never been treated as a coherent unit. It is partly
for this reason that issues are erratically and unpredictably adjudi-
cated. In criticizing the many formulae courts have espoused in
this area, Justice Black once concluded that none provided an
"infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yard-
stick," and that "there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked
formula." " The absence of a unified structure of preemption
principles frequently leaves the impression that the justices espouse
those principles that support the result they seek.'2 This situation
produces disingenuous, unreliable legal reasoning and precludes
states from enacting the best legislation possible.
The preemption doctrine invalidates state legislation that is in
conflict or incompatible with the legitimate exercise of federal au-
thority. The breadth of the doctrine and its relationship to complex
principles of federalism hinder the creation of overarching princi-
ples. At the most fundamental level of federal-state relations, pre-
emption doctrine limits state regulation because such regulation
intrudes into an area that the Constitution or the federal system has
entrusted to Congress or the President.13 At this level the federal
government has exclusive authority over the subject matter and
1O See text accompanying notes 157-210 infra.
11 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (opinion of the Court). Justice
Black noted that among the terms used to test the validity of state legislation
were: "conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irrecon-
ciliability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference." Id. (citation
omitted).
12 See Shifting Perspectives, supra note 4, at 632 n.54, 639 n.107 and accom-
panying text. For examples of the fluctuations of individual Justices stemming
from particular subject matter, see id. 652 n.212 and citations contained therein.
13 Dynamic Federalism, supra note 7, at 632, 633, 646 (preemption doctrine in-
validates state legislation by reason of the inherent nature of modern federalism,
even if the case is not covered by express constitutional requirements or does not
involve a treaty or congressional legislation). See Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429, 436, 440 (1968); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); note 7 supra.
1978]
200 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
states may not enact legislation adversely affecting it.14 This will
be referred to as the "intrusion principle."
At the level of federal-state relations in which the two govern-
mental systems possess concurrent power, the preemption doctrine
invalidates state legislation pursuant to principles stemming from
the supremacy clause. 15 The judiciary must uphold the supremacy
of federal law, "the laws of any state to the contrary notwithstand-
ing." 16 The supremacy clause requires the judiciary to invalidate
14See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968); Dynamic Federalism,
supra note 7, at 632-34; note 16 infra.
16 Shifting Perspectives, supra note 4, at 623-24; Dynamic Federalism, supra
note 7, at 635, 640; see Preferential Ground, supra note 4, at 209-10.
lO U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In its entirety the supremacy clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Alexander Hamilton explained the need for the supremacy clause in The Federalist:
If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the
laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by
its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the
individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere
treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government,
which is only another word for Political Power and Supremacy.... Hence
we perceive that the clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the
Union, like the one we have just before considered, only declares a truth,
which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal
government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (A. Hamilton) 193 (H. C. Lodge ed. 1888) (1st ed. 1788)
(emphasis in original). Hamilton, however, distinguished exclusive federal power
arising from the Constitution and the creation of a national sovereign from power
either exercised concurrently by the states, or reserved to the states under the tenth
amendment. This distinction is apparent in No. 32:
An entire consolidation of the states into one complete national sovereignty
would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers
might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general will.
But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolida-
tion, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively del-
egated to the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this
alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: where the
Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union;
where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted
an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would
be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.
Id. No. 32 (A. Hamilton) 186 (emphasis in original). In Hamilton's third example,
the judiciary would be required to find the federal exercise of authority supreme
when concurrent state authority was contradictory to or in direct conflict with its
federal counterpart. Authority that is a function of national sovereignty would not
be included in conflict analysis under the supremacy clause because such authority
has been exclusively delegated to the national government and state intrusion into
the area of such authority is invalid regardless of conflicts.
The tenth amendment preserves for exercise by the states authority which the
Constitution, either by express delegation or implicit delegation pursuant to the
[Vol. 127:197
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state legislation when it conflicts with federal legislation in the same
field. Courts tend first to inquire whether Congress has consciously
chosen to occupy a field.17 If Congress has expressly provided for
the exclusive exercise of federal authority within a field, state legis-
lation in the field will be preempted under the supremacy clause."'
A second supremacy clause principle is that even in the absence of
express congressional intent to dominate a field, such an intention
will be inferred if state regulation may produce a result in conflict
or inconsistent with the federal legislation.19 A third principle is
that an inference of congressional intent exclusively to occupy the
field will be made if the federal scheme is so pervasive as to indi-
cate that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it 20
or federal interests are so dominant as effectively to preclude state
legislation.2' The latter standard is similar to the intrusion princi-
ple articulated above. In the absence of a finding of preemption,
the tenth amendment preserves a state's right to exercise tradi-
tional police powers.
The confusion created by the multiplicity of principles is com-
pounded when Supreme Court Justices apply different standards of
intrusion, express intent, conflict, pervasiveness, and dominance.
The strictness of these standards often is dependent on the theory
of federalism 22 espoused by individual Justices. 23  This confusion
creation of national sovereignty, has not granted to the federal government. "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CoNsE. amend. X. In those preemption cases not involving express constitutional
delegation of power or conscious expressions of intent by the federal government,
it is the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the authority the state seeks to
exercise is preserved under the tenth amendment, or whether it is within exclusive
control of the federal government. E.g., Dynamic Federalism, supra note 7, at 635.
Cf. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432, 441 (1968) (although state legislation
did not directly contradict federal law, treaty or executive policy, it intruded into
federal domain of foreign affairs and was therefore invalid).
17 See note 13 supra & accompanying text. See generally Preferential Ground,
supra note 4, at 208.
IsSee, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947).
19See, e.g., id. 230; Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945);
Hodgson v. Cleveland Mun. Court, 326 F. Supp. 419, 434-36 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
2 0 See, e.g., Cuss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1957); Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1926).
21 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1956) (sedition
laws); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (alien registration laws).
2 2 As used here, theory of federalism is any theory concerning the proper alloca-
tion of power between state and federal governments. It is assumed that an advocate
of maximum state power would employ strict standards of intrusion, express intent,
inconsistency, pervasiveness and dominance and thereby make fewer findings of pre-
emption than would an advocate of federal power.
2 3 See note 12 supra & accompanying text.
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can be alleviated if preemption principles are integrated into a
coherent whole and based on common presumptions concerning the
division of authority between state and federal governments. Part
II of this Comment will propose such a unified approach. The
following four subsections outline in greater detail the Supreme
Court's application of supremacy clause principles.
B. The Express Preemption Principle
When statutory language expressly states that federal authority
is to occupy a field to the exclusion of concurrent state authority,
the federal judiciary must invalidate state legislation within that
field under the supremacy clause.24 The test is whether Congress
enacted statutory language clearly expressing its intention to termi-
nate concurrent state control and to vest exclusive power in the
federal government. 25 If the congressional legislation covers a field
that state police powers have traditionally regulated, preemption
should not occur unless exclusive control "was the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress." 26 Congressional intent is most clearly
manifested in statutory language, either allocating dominant control
of the field to the federal government 27 or maintaining concurrent
state jurisdiction.
28
Because Congress can clearly express an intent to preempt, the
question arises whether the absence of such a clause necessarily
implies an intent not to preempt, or whether it merely implies no
24 E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947); Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940); H.P. Welsh Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S.
79, 85 (1939); Charleston & W.C. By. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604
(1915). In Rice, for instance, the 1931 amendments to the United States Ware-
house Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-273 (1976), terminated concurrent jurisdiction and imple-
mented a system of exclusive federal regulation of federally licensed warehouses.
The amendments stated that "the power, jurisdiction, and authority conferred upon the
Secretary of Agriculture under this Act shall be exclusive with respect to all persons
securing a license hereunder so long as said license remains in effect:' Pub. L. No.
772, § 9, 46 Stat. 1465 (1931) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1976)); see 331 U.S.
at 223-24.
Strictness of intent standards has fluctuated over the years. See, e.g., Shifting
Perspectives, supra note 4, at 626-28 and cases cited therein.
25 See cases cited in note 24 supra.
26Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Allen-
Bradley Local 111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749
(1942); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)).
27See, e.g., The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (Supp. V 1975), which states in § 1416(d) that "no State
shall adopt or enforce any rule or regulation relating to any activity regulated by
this subchapter."
28These provisions are often called "savings clauses:' See, e.g., § 1370 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp.
V 1975).
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intent whatever. The question can also be expressed in reverse:
because Congress can explicitly express an intent to reserve authority
to the states, does the absence of such a clause imply congressional
intent to preempt? As one can pose the question from either per-
spective, and thereby obtain opposite results from the same legisla-
tion, no inference should be drawn merely from congressional
failure to include a preemption provision within the federal statute.
Hence the issue whether state legislation is preempted should not
depend only on the absence of an explicit federal statutory provi-
sion articulating congressional intent.
C. The Conflict Principle
Since no reasonable inference as to congressional intent to
occupy a field can be made from the absence of a statutory provi-
sion alone, the effect of the federal legislation and the nature of
the regulated field must be analyzed. The courts have supplemented
the express preemption principle by using the conflict and the occu-
pation of the field principles as grounds for inferring a congressional
intent to preclude the states from exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
The conflict principle requires the judiciary to invalidate a
state law that will produce a result inconsistent with the federal
statute.2 9 Although seemingly predictable and straightforward on
its face, application of the conflict principle depends upon the con-
flict standard employed by the bench. A distinction must be drawn
Some statutes include both types of provisions, relating to different aspects of
the field Congress has undertaken to regulate. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857
(Supp. V 1975), for example, provides in § 1857d-1 that,
[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . . nothing in this chapter shall preclude
or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or
enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants
or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution;
except that if an emission standard or limitation is in effect . . . such
State or political subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emission
standard or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation
under such plan or section.
§ 1857f-6a(a) provides, however, that no state may "adopt or attempt to enforce any
standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or . . .
engines subject to this part."
29 E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hill v.
Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1945).
Under this principle the court infers that Congress intended to occupy the field
of regulation to the extent state legislation is inconsistent with federal policies. In
Hill, for example, a Florida statute required a business agent of a labor union to
i) have been a United States citizen for more than 10 years, ii) not have been
convicted of a felony, and iii) be a person of good moral character. The Supreme
Court held the state legislation preempted by the National Labor Relations Act
because its provisions circumscribed the "full freedom of choice" employees were
intended to have when passing on an agent's qualifications. 325 U.S. at 541-47.
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between an "actual conflict" and a "potential conflict" standard.
The strict "actual conflict" standard operates in favor of the validity
of state legislation: state statutes have rarely been voided when it
was employed by the courts.30 The potential conflict standard,
however, works in the opposite direction, favoring federal suprem-
acy, and has been used to void state legislation.31
The actual conflict standard requires that there be "such actual
conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot
stand in the same area," 32 and has been said to be found only when
compliance with both schemes would be a "physical impossibil-
ity," 33 when the "repugnance or conflict [is] direct and positive, so
that the two acts could not be reconciled or- consistently stand to-
gether," 34 or when the two schemes are "contradictory and
repugnant." 3r
It is not quite so clear what the potential conflict standard re-
quires, since potential conflict is amorphous. Usually it involves
the determination that the state law frustrates an implied con-
gressional intent 36 or stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." -7
It may, however, amount to no more than the finding of a "danger
of conflict," 38 or simply a "potential conflict." 39 Thus the poten-
tial conflict leads to the invalidation of state legislation in cases in
30 See Shifting Perspectives, supra note 4, at 629. No conflict was found when
the "actual conflict" standard was applied in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117
(1973); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902). In Merrill
Lynch the Supreme Court refused to find preemption despite an arguable conflict,
which was said to be "extremely attenuated and peripheral, if it exists at all."
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. at 135.
81 See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees
v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
32 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
-3 Id. 143.
84 Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902). See Kelly v. Washington, 302
U.S. 1 (1937).
35 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973) (quoting Tim FEDERALIST
No. 32, supra note 16) (emphasis in original).
36 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165-68 (1978).
3 7 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Although the language quoted
was not originally used to find a potential conflict, it has been frequently cited for
this purpose, most recently in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158
(1978).
8s Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956).
39 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 <1959).
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which concurrent authority may possibly lead to conflict, while the
actual conflict standard invalidates state regulation that will neces-
sarily cause a conflict to arise.
40
In applying the conflict principle, the Court thus has access to
different standards and its choice clearly affects the disposition of
the preemption challenge. In discussing state laws that are com-
plementary to the federal scheme, for example, the Court has said
that "coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law
is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than
Congress has seen fit to go," 41 and that "complementary state regu-
lation is as fatal as state regulations which conflict with the federal
scheme." 42 At another time, however, the Court said that coinci-
dence is only one factor to be considered, and that the fact of iden-
tity does not require automatic invalidity.4 3 The confusion that
exists in such cases is further increased by the fact that the Court's
grounds for decision are unclear. The cases contain language both
of potential conflict and occupation of the field.
D. The Occupation of the Field Principle
Courts usually undertake analysis of the functional qualities of
a field of regulation when Congress has not expressed its intention to
exclude the states or when there is no finding of actual or poten-
tial conflict between the federal and state schemes. Occupation
of the field analysis focuses on the peculiar regulatory problems of
the field, the extent to which existing federal regulation controls
the field,44 and the presence of dominant federal interests within the
field,45 to decide whether Congress implicitly intended to exercise
preeminent authority.
Federal occupation of the field analysis is similar to that em-
ployed in cases where state legislation burdens interstate commerce
and is held invalid under the commerce clause.46 The relevant com-
merce clause analysis originated in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,47
which broke congressional power under the commerce clause into
40 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973).
41 Charleston & W.C. By. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915).
42 Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961).
48 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949).
4 4 See note 20 supra & accompanying text
4 5 See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
46 "[The Congress shall have Power] [tlo regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;" U.S. CoNSr.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Preferential Ground, supra note 4, at 219-20.
4753 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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distinct fields of application: some "imperatively demanding a single
uniform rule," others imperatively demanding the existence of simi-
lar power in the states to achieve the "diversity, which alone can
meet ... local necessities." 48
One standard that is used to determine whether Congress im-
plicitly intended to occupy the field is the pervasiveness of the fed-
eral regulatory system. When Congress or a federal agency has
established a complex scheme that appears to cover all possible
aspects of a given area, the courts have inferred a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field to the exclusion of the states.
49
A second significant standard is that of the dominance of the
federal interests involved. In some areas, such as immigration 0
and labor relations,51 the nature of the federal interest is held to be
so dominant that congressional intent to exercise exclusive authority
is inferred. Where Congress has articulated, or where the nature of
the field engenders, the necessity of national uniformity in regu-
lating a field, the court will find the state regulation preempted .
2
The dominance and pervasiveness standards are not mutually
exclusive, and both may be applied to the same case.53 Further-
more, "pervasiveness," "dominance," and the relevant "field of
48 Id. 319.
49 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956); Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954); Clover-
leaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926). This test was rejected, however, in New York Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). In Dublino, the court observed
that the "subjects of modem social and regulatory legislation often by their very
nature require intricate and complex responses from Congress," id 415, but that
Congress does not necessarily intend such complex schemes to be the exclusive means
of meeting the target problem. A detailed statute need not compel the inference
that Congress intended to occupy the field. Id.
5 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Cf. De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976) (not every state enactment dealing with aliens is a regulation
of immigration and per se preempted).
51 See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. By. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Carmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
52 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941). Inquiries into the necessity of national uniformity have been traced to
the Court's approach in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
53 Alternatively, the court might not find it necessary to apply either of them.
In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), the Court said that in
cases where the state legislation could be viewed as supplementary to the federal
regulation, the question is "whether the matter on which the State asserts the right
to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act. If it is, the federal scheme
prevails though it is a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the
State." Id. 236 (emphasis added).
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regulation" are all sufficiently indeterminate to allow wide varia-
tions in their application. If the field is defined broadly, for ex-
ample, the result will favor preemption; 54 if defined narrowly, the
presumption will run in favor of the state legislation.55  This flexi-
bility facilitates the result-oriented approach that has typified the
preemption cases.
E. Summary
Examination of preemption principles applied by courts leads
to the conclusion that preemption analysis has required an exami-
nation of more than statutory language and congressional intent.56
When Congress has not expressed its intention to exclude the
states,5 7 the courts have inferred congressional intent by applying
the conflict and occupation of the field principles. The results of
conflict analysis, however, hinge on whether an "actual" or "poten-
tial" conflict standard is applied, and this, in turn, often depends
on the doctrinal proclivities of individual members of the bench.58
Similarly, the results of federal occupation of the field analysis
depend upon the strictness of the pervasiveness and dominance stand-
ards used and upon the definition of the field itself.59 The strict-
ness of preemption standards is thus often a function of the review-
ing court's interpretation of the proper allocation of authority
between state and federal governments. 60 The resulting unpredicta-
ble application of the preemption doctrine prevents rational develop-
54 See id.
55 See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325
(1973); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U.S. 69 (1941); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); Kelly v. Washington,
302 U.S. 1 (1937); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); Reid v. Colorado, 187
U.S. 137 (1902).
56 Some commentators assume that preemption doctrine requires no more than
statutory construction. See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Law: Congressional Pre-
emption Held to Prevent State from Enforcing Stricter Pollution Standards Against
Nuclear Electrical Power Plant, 55 Mnnr. L. R~v. 1223, 1224 (1971) ("[plreemption
is a doctrine of statutory construction").
57Even when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous a court's inter-
pretation of statutory language can be unpredictable. Courts often rely on legislative
history to support interpretations of legislative intent at odds with the statutory
language. The Supreme Court has vacillated on the proper role legislative history
plays in making findings on legislative intent. Compare Cass v. United States, 417
U.S. 72, 76-79 (1974) and United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. 310 U.S.
534, 545 (1940) with Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978)
and Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917). See generally Murphy,
Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in
the "Moderne" Federal Courts, 75 COLUm. L. 1REv. 1299 (1975).
5s See notes 29-43 supra & accompanying text.
59 See notes 44-55 supra & accompanying text.
6o See Shifting Perspectives, supra note 4, at 630-46.
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ment of the federal system and vitiates the goal of reconciling "the
operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than
holding one completely ousted." 61
II. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT:
A UNIFIED APPROACH
States would be better able to protect their own interests and to
avoid intrusion on those of the nation if courts were to apply pre-
emption doctrine in a coherent and predictable manner. Congress
could alleviate much of the confusion in this area if it were to pass
a provision forbidding the inference of congressional intent exclu-
sively to occupy a field in the absence of a federal statute that con-
tains an express provision to that effect.62 Until such congressional
guidance is given, however, the burden of clarifying preemption
analysis must remain on the judiciary. It is the purpose of this
Comment to suggest a principled method for such analysis.
The combination of a comprehensive federal environmental
policy and intense state interests makes the field of environmental
regulation a particularly fruitful one for illustrating how coherent
preemption analysis could work. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
decided a preemption case in this area during its last term: Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Company.63 This case provides a concrete op-
portunity for contrasting the recommended approach with that of
the Court.
A. Federal Environmental Policy
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 64 (NEPA)
states that "it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government,
in cooperation with State and local governments, . . . to use all prac-
ticable means and measures, . . . in a manner calculated to foster
6OMerrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127
(1973) (citing Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
62 Such a bill was reported out of committee in 1958. H.R. 3, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., 104 CoNG. lEc. 11390 (1958). The House of Representatives passed the
bill, 104 CONG. REC. 14162 (1958), which, in part, provided:
No Act of Congress shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part
of Congress to occupy the field . . . unless such Act contains an express
provision to that effect, or unless there is a direct and positive conflict
between such Act and a State law so that the two cannot be reconciled or
consistently stand together.
Id. 13993. The Senate version, S. 654, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. Pac. 16127
(1958), failed to pass by one vote. 104 CONG. REc. 18928 (1958).
63 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
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and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony
. . it .5 As broadly interpreted by the courts, NEPA has made
environmental protection a fundamental consideration in the deci-
sionmaking processes of federal agencies. 60
The comprehensive and cooperative nature of federal environ-
mental policy is evident in other statutory schemes. These statutes
utilize a variety of cooperative mechanisms joining federal, state,
and local entities in the implementation and enforcement of en-
vironmental policy. The Clean Air Act,67 for example, encourages
cooperative efforts for the prevention and control of air pollution; 11
although the federal Environmental Protection Agency is charged
with the responsibility of establishing national air quality stand-
ards, 9 each state carries the primary responsibility for developing
and implementing a plan to achieve and maintain those standards."0
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 71
follow a similar pattern. The Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972 72 provides federal financial incentives for the development of
state programs to preserve coastal areas. Furthermore, it makes
agreement to comply with state coastal management plan require-
ments a precondition to issuance by federal agencies of licenses or
permits for activities involving land or water uses in coastal areas.73
The Deepwater Port Act of 1974,74 which regulates the location,
construction, and operation of deepwater ports and provides for
the protection of the marine and coastal environment, lists among
its purposes the protection of the rights and responsibilities of states
to regulate growth, determine land use, and otherwise protect their
environment.70  More significantly, the governor of an adjacent
65Id. §4331(a). NEPA requires a series of procedural steps, including the
preparation of environmental impact statements, as part of any "major" federal action
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. § 4332(2)(C).
66 See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 908 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F. 2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6742 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
03 Id. § 1857a(a).
69 Id. § 1857c-4.
70 Id& § 1857c-2.
7133 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
72 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
731_d. § 1 6 (c) (3).
7433 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (Supp. V 1975).
70Id. § 1501(a) (4).
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coastal state is given veto power over the construction of any off-
shore deepwater port facility.76 Finally, the Estuarine Areas Act of
1968 77 declares a congressional policy to "recognize, preserve, and
protect the responsibilities of the States in protecting, conserving,
and restoring the estuaries in the United States." 78
Although these statutes are only some of those within the en-
vironmental context, they manifest an explicit congressional policy
to provide comprehensive environmental protection through a co-
operative effort with the states. Three corollaries pertinent to pre-
emption analysis can be drawn from this federal environmental
policy. First, congressional intent is to have the states play a cre-
ative role in environmental regulation. Second, the paramount
congressional purposes of environmental legislation should be con-
sidered when courts define the purposes of a particular environ-
mental statute. Third, a finding of pervasive occupation of a field
should be established only if the federal regulatory scheme is com-
plex and exhaustive at the levels of formulation, implementation
or enforcement. If there is no strong showing of pervasiveness on
any of these levels, the legitimacy of concurrent state authority
should be presumed.
B. The Problem of Stricter State Standards
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.79 presented the question whether
state design standards and size limitations that were stricter than
their federal counterparts were preempted.80 The validity of stricter
state standards has been challenged in other environmental con-
texts, and disposition of the issue by courts has been both unpre-
dictable and inexplicable. For example, although municipalities
may not impose airport curfews because exclusive control of air-
space is vested in the federal government,8 ' local airport proprie-
tors are responsible for establishing permissible noise levels for the
76 Id. § 1503(c) (9). "Adjacent coastal state" is defined narrowly in § 1502(1).
77 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1226 (1976).
78 Id. § 1221.
79 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
80 See text accompanying notes 150-210 infra.
81 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
Burbank triggered a plethora of comment: See, e.g., Warren, Airport Noise Regula-
tion: Burbank, Aaron, and Air Transport, 5 ENVT'L AFF. 97 (1975), reprinted in
8 TRANsp. L.J. 403 (1976); Note, Federal Preemption of Local Airport Noise
Regulation, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 580 (1976); Note, Aircraft Noise Abatement: Is
There Room for Local Regulation.?, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 269 (1975); Note, Federal
Preemption in Airport Noise Abatement Regulation: Allocation of Federal and
State Power, 26 ME. L. REv. 321 (1974); Comment, City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc.: Federal Preemption of Aircraft Noise Regulation and the Future
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facility and the surrounding area.82 New York may prohibit the
importation of certain wild animal products not included on
the federal endangered species list,3 but Maryland may not ban the
importation of sealskins because the relevant federal statute "pur-
posely" refrained from prohibiting such action.8s The federal gov-
ernment has exclusive authority to regulate the construction and
operation of nuclear power plants, including protection from radia-
tion hazards,85 but it is possible that states retain authority over
nuclear power plant siting or non-radiation-oriented health and
safety regulations.8 6
Challenges and discussion of potential challenges have also
arisen with respect to air pollution control,87 pipeline siting,88 the
of Proprietary Restrictions, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CH-N E 99 (1974); Comment,
Federal Pre-emption and Airport Noise Control, 8 URn. L. ANN. 229 (1974); 40
J. Am L. & CoM. 341 (1974); 20 N.Y.L.F. 165 (1974); 5 RuT.-CA. L.J. 566
(1974); 22 U. KAN. L. REv. 319 (1974); 13 WASH3UPN L.J. 118 (1974).
82 British Airways Bd. v. Port Authority, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977); National
Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976). British Airways
concerns the right of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to ban landings
by the British-French Concorde supersonic transport. The Second Circuit held that
a reasonable, non-discriminatory noise regulation by the airport proprietor banning
particularly noisy aircraft would not be preempted. 558 F.2d at 82-83. Secretary
Coleman, then Secretary of Transportation, emphasized that he had not intended his
order allowing experimental flights by the Concorde to preempt local noise regula-
tions. President Carter and Secretary Coleman's successor, Brock Adams, reiterated
that position. Id. 81.
On remand, the district judge found that the Port Authority's 17 month delay
in establishing proper noise standards constituted an excessive and unjustified delay,
437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Second Circuit agreed that the ban on
Concorde flights, in the absence of uniform regulations, was unreasonable and dis-
criminatory, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
83Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971).
S4 Fouke Co. v. Mandel, 386 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Md. 1974). See Note,
Federal Preemption: A New Method for Invalidating State Laws Designed to Protect
Endangered Species, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv. 261 (1976).
85Northern States Power Co. v. Minn., 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 405
U.S. 1035 (1971).
86 See Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and
the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUm. L. REv. 392
(1976); Comment, Federal Preemption of State Laws Controlling Nuclear Power,
64 GEO. L.J. 1323 (1976); Note, Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Additional Reductions
in State Authority?, 28 U. FLA. L. REmw. 439 (1976). See also England, Recent
Regulatory Developments Concerning the Transportation of Nuclear Fuel and other
Radioactive Materials, 7 ENVT'L L. 203 (1977).
87See Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 548 F.2d 1088 (2d Cir. 1977); All-
way Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y.) aff'd, 468 F.2d
624 (2d Cir. 1972); cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit. 362 U.S.
440 (1960) (municipal smoke ordinance can be applied to federally registered
vessels). See also Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal
Pre-emption, 68 Mxcm L. REv. 1083 (1970).
S8 See Hershman & Fontenot, Local Regulation of Pipeline Sitings and the
Doctrines of Federal Preemption and Supremacy, 36 LA. L. BEv. 929 (1976).
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development of offshore mineral resources,89 pesticide use,90 solid
waste management, 91 hazardous substance labelling,92 liability for
oil spill cleanup costs, 98 energy development," and, inevitably, fed-
eral compliance with legitimate state regulation. 95 It is true that
cases in all of these categories must turn in part on the particular
wording and congressional history of the statute involved, as do all
preemption decisions. Nonetheless, judging from past experience,
inconsistencies are likely. The resulting lack of predictability as to
what state legislation will be permissible certainly must discourage
the best possible cooperative effort by the states, and ultimately may
frustrate national environmental policy as a whole.
C. A Unified Method of Preemption Analysis in
The Environmental Context
Significant progress toward the goal of consistent adjudication of
preemption challenges can be made if the federal policy of compre-
89 See Beeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf
Mineral Resources, 28 STAN. L. BEv. 1107 (1976); Swan, Remembering Maine:
Offshore Federalism in the United States and Canada, 6 CAL. W. INr'L L.J. 296
(1976); Note, Right, Title and Interest in the Territorial Sea: Federal and State
Claims in the United States, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 463 (1974); Comment,
jurisdiction Over the Seabed: Persistent Federal-State Conflicts, 12 Urn. L. AxN.
291 (1976).
90 See Megysey, Governmental Authority to Regulate the Use and Application
of Pesticides: State vs. Federal, 21 S.D.L. Rev. 652 (1976).
91 The "Oregon Bottle Case," American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Cont.
Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973), was decided on a commerce
clause theory, but much of the rationale is analogous to a preemption theory. See
Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87
Hiv. L. REv. 1762 (1974).
92 Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Clark, 482 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1973).
For relief from the tedium of law review articles, see Chief Judge Brown's pun-
laden concurring opinion.
93 Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973). See
Maloof, Oil Pollution: Cleaning Up the Legal Mess, 43 I-4s. CouNsEL . 605 (1976);
Case Comment, Federal Maritime Jurisdiction and State Marine Pollution Legisla-
tion: The Florida Act Not Preempted Per Se, 28 U. Ml. n L. Rlv. 209 (1973).
Askew held that state laws providing for oil spill damage compensation were
not preempted by federal legislation. A number of bills have been introduced in
Congress that would serve to overturn Askew. According to the Department of the
Interior, federal preemption of such state laws is essential to the effective applica-
tion of any comprehensive oil spill legislation. See [1977-78] 8 ENvml. REP. (BNA)
359.
94 See White & Barry, Energy Development in the West: Conflict and Co-
ordination of Governmental Decision-Making, 52 N.D.L. REV. 451 (1976).
95E.P.A. v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S.
167 (1976); People v. Dep't of Navy, 431 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See
Niehaus, Federal Compliance with State Environmental Procedures, A.F.L. REV.,
Fall 1976, at 1; Walston, State Control of Federal Pollution: Taking the Stick
Away from the States, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 429 (1977).
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hensive environmental protection is viewed as requiring that federal
standards be treated as the minimum necessary.96 Health and safety
statutes, as well as others that can be classified as protecting the
"'general welfare," have traditionally been held to be within the
scope of the police power reserved to the states under the tenth
amendment of the Constitution.97 State environmental legislation
has traditionally been treated as stemming from the same authority.9
Such forms of police power have received special treatment in pre-
emption doctrine. Even during periods when uniform federal regu-
lation was favored and a presumption existed in favor of federal
preemption, 9 persuasive reasons were necessary to overcome the
presumption that such exercises of traditional police power were
valid.100 Furthermore, while standards of general applicability can
certainly be established on a national basis, each area of the coun-
try has its own particular needs and priorities, "imperatively de-
manding that diversity [of regulation] which alone can meet the
local necessities." 101
The federal government, on the other hand, has articulated the
primary policy of using "all practicable means and measures" 102 to
avoid environmental harm. Comprehensive federal environmental
authority overlaps with the states' authority to protect its citizens'
health and welfare. The potential conflict entailed in such over-
lap is reduced when states join the effort to protect the environment
under the cooperative federal framework. 103  It would, however,
frustrate the basic congressional purpose to provide comprehensive
environmental protection if states enacted legislation which pro-
vided less protection for the environment.
98If Congress expresses its intention to the contrary, this presumption is re-
butted.
9
7 See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Savage
v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
98See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325
(1973); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960);
American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Contr. Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d
691 (1973).
99 See Shifting Perspectives, supra note 4, at 630-39.
100 When Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the states, the
court starts "with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).
101 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851). At least one corn-
mentator has suggested that there is a strong case for local environmental juris-
dictions. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 EcoLoGY L.Q. 193 (1974).
10242 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970). See text accompanying note 65 supra.
10 3 See text accompanying notes 64-78 supra.
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This potentially discordant interface of federal and state au-
thority can be harmonized if federal environmental standards are
treated as minimum standards and equally or more stringent state
regulations are presumed valid. The presumption of validity could
be overcome if preemption analysis revealed that Congress or na-
tional interests required it. Such a presumption does not frustrate
the primary purpose of federal environmental legislation, preserves
a role for states in exercising their police power, and is consistent
with the ideal that concurrent authority be construed with a view
toward maintaining both and ousting neither.10 4 Integregation of
these conceptions of the proper relation of federal and state au-
thority with fundamental preemption principles will lead to a more
consistent analytic process in the environmental context. The fol-
lowing structure of analysis provides such an integration.
1. The Express Preemption Principle
The first inquiry of preemption analysis should be whether the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress was to exclude state au-
thority in the particular sub-field of environmental regulation.10 5
The strict standard of proof required at this stage stems from the
judicial deference paid to traditional state police authority.10 A
showing of exclusive intent is dependent on express statutory lan-
guage: no inference of congressional intent to exclude state author-
ity should be made in the absence of such language. 10 7
2. The Conflict Principle
The next step of the analysis entails inquiry into whether the
state legislation stands as an obstacle to the general federal objec-
tive of comprehensive environmental protection and the narrower
objectives of the relevant federal statute. 08 Given the federal policy
of cooperation in the field,10 9 complementary state regulation should
be treated favorably, and state standards as restrictive as or more
restrictive than their federal counterparts should be presumed
'
0 4 See note 61 supra & accompanying text.
-0 5 See note 26 supra & accompanying text.
1o See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
107 Id. No finding of an express congressional intent to leave an area unregu-
lated is permissible absent a specific statutory provision. For an example of such
congressional intent see, e.g., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§7 543(a), 7545
(c)(4)(A) (Supp. Nov. 1977).
108 See text accompanying notes 29-43 supra.
109 See text accompanying notes 64-78 supra.
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valid. °10  An "actual conflict" standard"' should be applied. To
be in "actual conflict" the state statute must stand as an impediment
to compliance with the federal statute or compliance with the two
schemes must be a "physical impossibility." 112 Put simply, no con-
flict should be found unless there is an "impossibility of dual com-
pliance." n3 Since federal standards are to be treated as minima,
actual conflict will exist only when the regulatee would be subject
to an action for noncompliance with federal regulations after com-
plying with state regulations.
It will be recalled that traditional preemption analysis uses
the conflict principle more broadly than this. Beyond the "actual
conflicts" described above, "potential conflicts" are said to be found
where it is anticipated that the state law may frustrate some federal
interest that Congress implicitly sought to protect.1 4 The enter-
prise of locating such potential conflicts, however, really requires
the courts to determine the importance of the federal interests in-
volved. This is so because the courts are not likely to infer that
Congress intended to protect unimportant federal interests to the
exclusion of states. For this reason, such potential conflicts are
more appropriately considered under the dominance standard of
the occupation of the field principle.
3. The Occupation of the Field Principle
If the state legislation in question has survived the express
preemption and conflict stages of the proposed analysis, 15 the next
inquiry should be whether the nature of federal involvement in the
field warrants the conclusion that state authority has been effec-
tively excluded." 6
The first step is to establish whether congressional control of
the field is pervasive. Pervasive occupation is established if Con-
gress or a federal agency has established a complex scheme which
entails promulgation of standards, their implementation, and en-
forcement, and covers all aspects of the pertinent environmental
"1
0 See text accompanying notes 103-104 supra.
"'1 See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
112 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
"13 Id. The Supreme Court pointed out that such impossibility of compliance
would exist if "federal orders forbade the picking and marketing of any avocado
testing more than 7% oil, while the California test excluded from the State any
avacado measuring less than 8% oil content." Id.
L4 See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
115 If the challenged statute is deficient under either express preemption or
conflict analysis, there is no reason to proceed to the third stage.
1 1 6 See text accompanying notes 44-55 supra.
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sub-field.117 A strong showing of pervasiveness should be neces-
sary to support preemption, since Congress has expressed its inten-
tion that the states play a creative role in environmental regula-
don.118  Application of the pervasiveness standard should rarely
result in preemption within the environmental context.
The second step in this stage of the analysis is to establish
whether federal interests are dominant within the pertinent field."19
This entails a meticulous itemization of the federal interests af-
fected by the state legislation and the state interests served by it.
If i) the federal interests have national significance, ii) the federal
interests clearly predominate over those served by the state legisla-
tion, and iii) the nature of federal involvement in the field requires
uniform standards, dominance of federal interests has been shown.
The balancing process implicit in applying the dominance
standard requires the court to consider the particular regulatory
problems inherent in the environmental sub-field. If effective con-
trol is possible only through consistent nationwide enforcement,
the weight of federal interests increases. The court should inquire
whether "Balkanization" 120 will serve as a substantial impediment
to realization of federal goals. The court should, however, attribute
additional weight to the state's interests if its regulatory scheme
responds to environmental problems peculiar to the geographic
region and is narrowly tailored to deal with those problems. Fur-
thermore, little weight should be attributed to the state regulatory
scheme if it is overbroad or is not rationally related to its avowed
purposes.
The court must also consider the subject matter of the state
regulation and determine how state control of this subject matter
will affect federal authority to conduct foreign policy, defend na-
tional borders, and perform other acts of national sovereignty.
Direct and indirect impact on federal regulation of foreign com-
merce and the national economy must be evaluated. If state legis-
lation disrupts the interaction of federal regulatory schemes in non-
environmental fields, federal interests should be found dominant.
Even if Congress has not enacted legislation in a particular field,
state legislation that encroaches on authority primarily entrusted
1
1 7 See text following note 78 supra.
:1IS See text accompanying notes 44-55 supra.
119 See note 21 supra and text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
120'"Balkanization" is the process by which states enact diverse and con-
flicting legislation within the same field. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,
431 U.S. 265, 286 (1977).
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to the federal government by the Constitution 121 must be held out-
weighed by dominant federal interests. It is at this point that the
dominance standard merges into the intrusion principle: if the state
regulatory scheme has intruded into an area of exclusive federal
authority, it should be held preempted.
122
Application of the occupation of the field principle therefore
requires inquiry into the interaction between the state regulatory
scheme and federal authority. If federal interests equal or out-
weigh the local interests served by the state statute, preemption
doctrine requires uniform national standards to prevail over state
standards.
The Supreme Court was recently confronted with typical en-
vironmental preemption issues in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Com-
pany.123 In order to illustrate how the recommended approach to
preemption analysis differs from that which the Court now em-
ploys, this case will be examined in detail.
III. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.124
On September 8, 1975, the State of Washington's new Tanker
Law ' 25 became effective. On the same day, Atlantic Richfield Com-
pany filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington seeking an injunction barring enforcement
of the statute on the grounds that it was preempted by the federal
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972,1216 that it was invalid under
the commerce clause,12 7 and that it additionally interfered with
federal control of foreign affairs and treaty-making.128  In order
properly to analyze the issues in the case, the state and federal
statutes involved need to be described in some detail.
121 Generally, the federal powers referred to here are those enumerated in the
Constitution, article I, section 8, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
' 22 The Supreme Court rested its holding on such an analysis in Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Probate provisions enacted by Oregon were held
to be "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Con-
stitution entrusts to the President and the Congress." Id. 432.
123435 U.S. 151 (1978).
124 Id.
125 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 88.16.170-.190 (Supp. 1977).
126 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (Supp. V 1975); 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
Also involved were federal vessel registration, enrollment, and licensing laws. See
46 U.S.C. §§319, 263, 251 (1970).
127 U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cI. 3.
128 This comment will discuss only the preemption challenge.
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A. The Tanker Law
The Washington Tanker Law 129 (Tanker Law) involved was
passed in response to a legislative finding that "the transportation of
crude oil and refined petroleum products by tankers on Puget Sound
and adjacent waters creates a great potential hazard to important
natural resources of the state and to jobs and income dependent on
these resources." 130 The legislature further concluded that the
configuration of Puget Sound is such that a greater likelihood of
long-term damage from any large oil spill exists there than else-
where, and that areas of the Sound have limited maneuvering space
and contain many natural navigational obstacles. The Washington
legislature therefore announced its
intent and purpose . . . to decrease the likelihood of oil
spills on Puget Sound and its shorelines by requiring all
oil tankers above a certain size to employ Washington
state licensed pilots and, if lacking certain safety and
maneuvering capability requirements, to be escorted by a
tug or tugs while navigating on certain areas of Puget
Sound and adjacent waters. 131
Thus Section 2 of the Tanker Law required any oil tanker of
50,000 deadweight tons (DWT) or more to take a Washington state
licensed pilot while navigating Puget Sound and adjacent waters.
32
Section 3(1) totally prohibited tankers of more than 125,000 DWT
(so-called "supertankers") from entering the sound. Section 8(2)
permitted passage of tankers between 40,000 and 125,000 DWT
only if they either met enumerated safety design criteria, which
no existing tanker met,133 or took on a tug escort when entering
Puget Sound.134
129 WASH. RFV. CODE A.NN. §§ 88.16.170-.190 (Supp. 1977).
130 Id. § 88.16.170. Puget Sound is a large body of inland water in north-
west Washington, with more than 2,500 square miles of inlets, channels, and bays.
More than 200 islands populate the Sound's waters, and its 2,000 miles of shore-
line contain numerous marshes, tidal fiats, wetlands, and beaches. 435 U.S. at 154
n.1. The Sound and its adjacent shores provide spawning and nursing areas for
over 2,000 marine species, migratory habitats for waterfowl, as well as employ-
ment, recreational, scientific, and educational opportunities for the people of Wash-
ington. Brief of Appellants at 11, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants]. The fishing industry in Puget Sound
contributes $170 million annually to the state's economy, and it is estimated that
in 1975 tourists in the counties adjacent to the Sound, where two-thirds of the
state's population resides, spent more than $92 million. Id. 11 & 12 n.17.
131WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1977).
132 Id. § 88.16.180.
'3.3 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 173 n.24 (1978). For a de-
scription of the design requirements see note 167 infra.
18
4 WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 88.16.190 (Supp. 1977).
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B. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 13 (PWSA) was
enacted in response to a series of major oil spills, 36 and was de-
signed to protect United States navigable waters and shorelines
from damage resulting from maritime accidents. The PWSA is
comprised of two titles. The vessel traffic provisions of title I "can
be likened to providing safer surface highways and traffic controls
for automobiles," while the vesel design requirements of title II
"can be likened to providing safer automobiles to transit those
highways." 137 Title I of the PWSA 138 was intended to prevent
damage to, or the destruction or loss of any vessel, bridge,
or other structure on or in the navigable waters of the
United States, or any land structure or shore area imme-
diately adjacent to those waters; and to protect the navi-
gable waters and the resources therein from environmental
harm resulting from vessel or structure damage, destruc-
tion, or loss. .. .139
Accordingly, it gives the secretary of the department in which the
Coast Guard is located (the Secretary) authority to establish and
require compliance with vessel traffic systems for congested waters;
to control vessel traffic in areas determined to be especially hazard-
ous in certain circumstances (such as inclement weather) by spe-
cifying scheduling, routing, and size and speed limitations, and by
restricting operation to vessels with particular operating capabili-
ties that he considers necessary for safe operation under the circum-
stances; to direct anchoring when necessary to prevent damage; to
require pilots; to establish unloading procedures; to prescribe mini-
mum safety equipment requirements for structures; to establish
waterfront safety zones; and to establish inspection procedures. 140
A number of title I subsections are of particular relevance to
preemption challenges. First, the Secretary's authority over pilotage
is extremely limited as to vessels engaged in foreign trade, extending
only to situations "where a pilot is not otherwise required by State
185 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (Supp. V 1975) and 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp.
V 1975).
13 6 See S. REP. No. 92-724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972), reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CODE CONe. & AD. Nmws 2766, 2769 (hereinafter referred to as "S. REP.").
137S. Rnp., supra note 136, at 9-10, [1972] U.S. CoDE CONG. & An. Naws at
2769.
ss33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (Supp. V 1975).
'39 Id. § 1221.
140 Id.
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law to be on board until the State having jurisdiction of an area
involved establishes a requirement for a pilot in that area or under
the circumstances involved.14' Second, in conjunction with the
requirement that the Secretary consult with other federal agencies,
the Secretary is given authority to "consider, utilize, and incorpo-
rate regulations or similar directory materials issued by port or other
State and local authorities." 142 Third, one factor the Secretary is
to consider in establishing regulations is "local practices and cus-
toms." 143 The Secretary is also required to provide an opportunity
for consultation and comment to state and local governments. 144
Finally, the Act provides that "[n]othing contained in this chapter
... prevent[s] a State or political subdivision thereof from prescrib-
ing for structures only higher safety equipment requirements or
safety standards than those which may be prescribed pursuant to this
chapter." 145
Title II of the PWSA 146 authorizes the Secretary "to establish
comprehensive regulations for the design, construction, mainte-
nance, and operation of vessels carrying certain cargos in bulk for
the purpose of protecting the marine environment." 147 It thus
supplements title I "by also requiring that vessels be built to
higher standards of design and construction, and subject to higher
standards in their operation." 148 The Secretary's regulatory power
is broad, and applies to foreign flag as well as United States vessels
entering our navigable waters. The Secretary may deny entry to
any vessel not in compliance.
149
C. Preemption Analysis in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
In response to Arco's suit, a three judge district court decided
that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act preempted the field and
held that Washington's Tanker Law was invalid in its entirety.150
1411d. § 1221(5). Other federal provisions do, however, preclude state pilot
requirements in addition to those imposed by the federal government for vessels
engaged in domestic trade and federal pilots are required for these vessels. 46
U.S.C. §§ 215 & 264 (1970).
-t42 33 U.S.C. § 1222(c) (Supp. V 1975).
143 Id. § 1222(e)(7).
144 Id. 9 1224.
145 Id. §1222(b).
14646 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
147 S. REP., supra note 136, at 7, [19721 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 2767.
148 Id.
14946 U.S.C. § 391a(13) (Supp. V 1975).
15o Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C75-648 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24,
1976). The court did not reach the commerce clause or foreign treaty power is-
sues. It also declined to comment on Washington's sovereign immunity challenge
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On appeal, 5' the Supreme Court agreed with the district court
in its judgment that the pilot requirement for "enrolled vessels," 152
the design standards,'53 and the size limitations 154 were preempted,
but held, contrary to the lower court, that the pilot requirement
for "registered vessels" 1r5 and the tug escort provision 156 were not.
1. Pilot Requirement
On appeal, the state of Washington conceded that the pilot
requirement was in conflict with federal law insofar as it applied
to tankers "enrolled in coastwise trade," 167 and appellees con-
ceded that no conflict existed as to the registered vessels.' 58 The
Court agreed with these concessions, reversing the lower court only
as to the pilot requirements for registered vessels. 59 Justice White,
expressing the opinion of all nine Justices, relied on two statutory
provisions to conclude that "these two statutes read together give
the Federal Government exclusive authority to regulate pilots on
enrolled vessels and ... they preclude a State from imposing its own
pilotage requirements upon them." 160 On the other hand, he noted
to jurisdiction. The three-judge court initially refused to order injunctive relief,
apparently assuming Washington would not attempt to enforce the law. When
it became apparent in November that the state did intend to enforce it pending ap-
peal, injunctive relief was granted, but at the request of appellants was stayed
until December 15th. A continuation of the stay was granted by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, 429 U.S. 1334 (December 9, 1976), and by the full court on January 10,
1977, 429 U.S. 1035 (1977).
For discussions of Ray written before the Supreme Court disposed of the case
see, e.g., Note, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield: A Case for Preemption, 5 HAsTiNcs
CONST. L.Q. 563 (1978); Note, Pre-emption and the Commerce Clause Revisited:
The 1975 Washington Tanker Law, 17 NATuRAL R souncEs J. 691 (1977).
5 1 BRay v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
1521d. 158-59. The entire court believed that pilot requirements were pre-
empted insofar as they applied to enrolled vessels. See note 158 infra.
153 Id. 168. Six Justices believed the district court should be affirmed in this
respect. See note 168 infra.
154 Id. 174-78. See note 198 infra.
155 Id. 159-60. The entire court found the invalidation of the pilot require-
ment for registered vessels overbroad, and reversed on this point.
158Id. 171-72. Seven Justices believed the district court's judgment should
be reversed on this point. See note 183 infra.
167435 U.S. at 159. 'Enrolled" vessels are those "engaged in domestic or
coastwide trade or used for fishing," whereas "registered" vessels are those engaged
in trade with foreign countries. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265,
272-73 (1977).
158 Id. 160.
159 Id.
160 Id. 159. The Court relied on 46 U.S.C. §§ 364 & 215 (1970), which in
part provide, respectively, that "every coastwise seagoing steam vessel subject
19781
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that one provision expressly authorizes and another allows for state
pilot requirements for non-enrolled vessels. 101 Accordingly, the
pilot requirement for enrolled vessels was preempted and that for
non-enrolled vessels was not.
The Court's analysis of the pilot requirements was the only
part of the opinion consistent with the approach proposed in this
Comment. Federal law contains an express requirement of fed-
erally licensed pilots for enrolled vessels 162 and an express declara-
don that "[n]o State... shall impose upon pilots... any obligation
to procure a State ... license in addition to that issued by the
United States .... ,, 163 The Washington Tanker Law had imposed
just such an obligation on pilots for enrolled vessels. This was
express preemption, and eliminated any need to look beyond the
statute.
The federal law involved, however, also states that this prohibi-
tion is not to "affect any regulation . . . requiring vessels . . . other
than coastwise steam vessels, to take a pilot duly licensed or au-
thorized by the laws of such State ... ," 14 The Court found that
this provision left the state free as to pilotage requirements for
vessels not enrolled in the coastwise trade. 65 Under the methodo-
logical approach of this Comment, it would ordinarily have been
necessary for the Court to further consider whether there was an
actual conflict between the state pilot requirement for non-enrolled
vessels and other federal law, and, if not, whether the federal gov-
ernment so occupied the field as effectively to preempt the state
requirement. The appellees, however, had conceded that this re-
quirement was not preempted. In this circumstance, the recom-
mended presumption of validity to be accorded more stringent state
laws '166 should become operative and no attempt need have been
made to question further the validity of this part of the state pro-
vision.
to the navigation laws of the United States .. .not sailing under register, shall
when under way . . . be under the control and direction of pilots licensed by the
Coast Guard" and that "[nlo state or municipal government shall impose upon
pilots of steam vessels any obligation to procure a state or other license in addition
to that issued by the United States ...... (emphasis added).
161 Id. 159-60.
16246 U.S.C. § 364 (1970) (quoted supra note 160).
168 46 U.S.C. § 215 (1970).
164 Id. The PWSA also explicitly allows state pilotage requirements for foreign
vessels. See 33 U.S.C. § 1221(5) (Supp. V 1975).
165 435 U.S. at 159-60.
166 See text accompanying notes 96-104 supra.
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2. Design Standards
Washington's design standards167 for all oil tankers of from
40,000 to 125,000 DWT were invalidated by six Justices applying
occupation of the field and conflict principles.1 8
Justice White first applied the pervasiveness standard to title II
of the PWSA and concluded that a comprehensive statutory pat-
tern warranted the inference that Congress intended the creation
of "uniform national standards for design and construction of tank-
ers that would foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent
state requirements." 169 He attempted to support this inference
further by referring to the legislative history. Unfortunately the
legislative history does not explain why Congress enacted the statu-
tory language "comprehensive minimum standards" 170 and could
just as easily be used to show that all Congress sought to enact were
uniform minimum standards.
Justice White's second argument employed the language of
potential conflict analysis. He reasoned that because a ship com-
plying with federal standards might be denied entry to the waters
of a state with stricter standards, this would frustrate the implied
congressional intention to establish uniform national 1 71 and inter-
national design standards. 172 An earlier case, however, had upheld
state safety standards stricter than the relevant federal law for cer-
tain vessels.173 This case was distinguished on the ground that it
1
67 XVAsn. REv. CoDE Axm'c. § 88.16.190(2) (Supp. 1977), requires enrolled
and registered oil tankers of from 40,000 to 125,000 DWT to possess all of the
following "standard safety features":
(a) Shaft horsepower in the ratio of one horsepower to each two and
one-half deadweight tons;
(b) Twin screws;
(c) Double bottoms, underneath all oil and liquid cargo compart-
ments;
(d) Two radars in working order and operating, one of which must
be collision avoidance radar;
(e) Such other navigational position location systems as may be
prescribed from time to time by the board of pilotage commissioners.
168 Justices Marshall, Brennan and Rehnquist believed the design standards
should be treated as an optional alternative to the tug escort requirement, and
that in light of the Court's approval of Washington's tug requirement there was no
need to speculate on the validity of the design standards. 435 U.S. at 181
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Implicit in this argument is the application of the
actual conflict standard and the view that state legislation should not be invalidated
if the regulatee can comply with both regulatory schemes.
169 435 U.S. at 163.
17046 U.S.C. § 391(a) (Supp. V 1975).
171435 U.S. at 165.
172 Id. 168.
173 Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
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involved a state statute touching on different matters 17- than the
federal provisions, whereas in the instant case "[t]he federal scheme
... aims precisely at the same ends as" the Tanker Law.
175
Under the approach suggested by this Comment, it would have
first been necessary to decide whether the state design standards had
been expressly preempted. No PWSA provision expressly requires
exclusive federal authority in the field of tanker design. The Court
was therefore correct in moving on to the question of conflict.
Its reasoning in this area, however, is incompatible with the
proposed approach. Using that approach, the Court would have
inquired whether the Tanker Law stood as an impediment to gen-
eral federal environmental policy or to the specific policies of title II
of the PWSA. Since section 391 (a) 171 speaks of preventing harm
to "the marine environment," it is unlikely that a state law en-
acted to realize the same goal could stand as an impediment to this
general federal goal. Furthermore, "no inevitable collision between
the two schemes of regulation" was apparent "despite the dissimi-
larity of the standards." 17 If the possibility of "dual compli-
ance" 178 existed, no actual conflict was present and the Tanker Law
design standards should not have been preempted under conflict
analysis.
The next step under the proposed method would have been
to consider the design standards under the occupation of the field
principle. Although the Court did argue that the federal regula-
tion here was pervasive, the argument is hardly convincing. The
statutory language "comprehensive minimum standards of design"
and the vague, ambiguous legislative history do not suggest that
Congress established a complex, all-encompassing framework regu-
lating design. Rather than relying on such a strained finding of
pervasiveness and its earlier finding of a hypothetical conflict with
an implied congressional intent, the Court should have frankly con-
sidered whether federal interests dominated the field. The rela-
tionship of the particular PWSA design provisions to the Act as a
whole and to comprehensive federal environmental policy should
174 435 U.S. at 165. The federal statute involved in Kelly did not include
provision for "inspection of . . . motor-driven tugs in order to insure safety or de-
termine seaworthiness," Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 8 (1937), where these
tugs were of the type covered by the state law as applied. Id.
275 435 U.S. at 165.
17646 U.S.C. § 391(a) (Supp. V 1975).
177 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
178 Id. Dual compliance was especially likely if the Tanker Law design pro-
visions were considered as an alternative to the tug escort requirement. The Court
chose to analyze the design standards "standing alone." 435 U.S. at 160-61.
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have been articulated. If these federal interests were seriously jeop-
ardized by the enforcement of the Tanker Law, then federal author-
ity should have been found to preempt the state provision. This
conclusion would not have been automatic in Ray: the fundamental
federal goal of protecting the marine environment was not threat-
ened and national regulations of tankers would hardly be affected
since the Tanker Law covered only Puget Sound.
Even if these considerations did not indicate preemption, how-
ever, such a determination would not have ended dominance stand-
ard analysis. State authority in a field can be excluded if it adversely
affects federal interests in an indirect manner. For example, if
Washington's design standards proved to be a substantial burden on
the national economy, the Court should have weighed these costs to
the federal system against the benefits provided by the standards
to the state. If impediments to the exercise of federal authority
outweighed state benefits, the law should have been held preempted
for this reason. Hence if the federal government's ability to con-
duct foreign policy or regulate international commerce were signifi-
cantly impeded by the Tanker Law design standards, the dominance
of federal interests should have been held to have excluded state
regulation of tanker design.179
3. Tug Escort Requirement
An oil tanker of from 40,000 to 125,000 DWT not complying
with Tanker Law design standards could nonetheless enter Puget
Sound if it submitted to tug escort.' s0 Seven Justices agreed that
the tug escort requirement was severable from the alternative Tanker
Law design standards.' 8 ' In light of federal tug regulation as it
then stood, no actual conflict existed 8 2 between the Washington
tug escort requirement and the Secretary's authority to operate
"vessel traffic services and systems." s83 The majority chose not to
rely on the potential conflict standard applied to the design stand-
1 79 In this context the legislative history cited by the Court is more relevant.
The Senate Report, S. REP., supra note 136, at 23, [1972] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2789, speaks of the need for international solutions to marine pollution.
ISOWASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 88.16.190(2) (Supp. 1977).
181435 U.S. at 171-72.
182 Id.
18333 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975). Justices Stevens and Powell believed
that since Washington's design standards were preempted, no burden on noncompli-
ance could be imposed. 435 U.S. at 188-90. Applying a potential conflict stand-
ard, they further believed that Congress' goal of uniform standards might be
thwarted by disparate state regulations. Id. 189.
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ards.'84 No principled reason was given for the shift in conflict
standards.
Title I of the PWSA merely authorizes the Secretary to issue
regulations governing vessel traffic; 185 it does not expressly forbid
states to require tankers to use tug escorts. There was therefore no
express preemption of this state requirement. Furthermore, the
Secretary has not yet exercised his authority to promulgate tug
regulations.186  No impossibility of dual compliance exists. Thus,
the Court properly applied the actual conflict standard.
The next step, however, should have been to analyze the occu-
pation of the field problems presented by the tug escort require-
ment. Justices Stevens and Powell argued, in dissent, that the tug
requirement was "a special penalty for failure to comply with" 187
the design requirements and should have been preempted because
of the same federal interests invoked against those requirements.
The majority did not really respond to this argument. The pro-
posed approach would have required it to do so under occupation
of the field analysis.
The Court should have discussed the implications of the tug
escort requirement for fields in which federal interests are pre-
eminent. Given the absence of tug regulations, federal law could
hardly be found pervasive. But the question of dominance of
federal interests should also have been addressed.
In recent years the federal government has attempted to create
a coherent energy policy. Over half of the crude oil consumed by
the United States is imported, 88 and the federal government has
a strong interest in seeing that the consumer pays the lowest price
possible for imported crude oil. Use of tug escorts raises the price
of crude oil' 8 9 and for that reason the benefits of the tug escort
184 Id. 171-73. The Court acknowledged that a potential conflict with legiti-
mate exercise of federal authority existed, but argued that such a conflict could
serve as a basis for tug escort requirement preemption only when it became an
actuality. Id. 172.
18533 U.S.C. §§ 1221(1) & (2) (Supp. V 1975).
1s6 The Secretary has issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to re-
quire tug escorts in certain circumstances. 41 Fed. Reg. 18770 (1976), proposing
to amend Navigation Safety Regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 164 (1977). In his notice of
rulemaking in 1977, he stated that the proposed "rule for tug assistance in con-
fined waters . . . .is to be the subject of a future rulemaking action." 42 Fed.
Reg. 5958 (1977). If these regulations are promulgated, the possibility for actual
conflict may exist.
187 435 U.S. at 189.
188 Brief for Appellees at 4 n.5, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978).
189 Brief for Appellants, supra note 130, at 19.
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requirement should have been weighed against the adverse effect
on federal interests.
Assuming a 120,000 DWT tanker is used, the tugboat require-
ment causes the transportation cost per barrel of Alaskan oil to in-
crease from forty cents to just under forty-one cents; less than one
cent is added to the per-barrel transportation cost of $1.40 for
Middle Eastern oil.190 The international and economic ramifica-
dons of such an increase would probably be small. The preventive
benefits of the tug escort requirement for Washington are probably
greater. Provided Washington could show that there is a reasonable
relationship between the use of tug escorts and the minimization
of the threat of oil spills, it would be able to show significant inter-
ests peculiar to Puget Sound. Beyond its considerable but unquan-
tifiable value as an aesthetic resource, Puget Sound and its adjacent
shores provide spawning and nursing areas for over two thousand
marine species, migratory habitats for waterfowl, as well as employ-
ment, recreational, scientific, and educational opportunities for the
people of Washington. 191 The fishing industry alone contributes
$170,000,000 annually to Washington's economy. 92 A major oil
spill would have significant potential for destruction or damage to
both the Sound's marine life and the industry and jobs dependent
on the Sound.
The Court should have weighed these and other interests to
determine whether tugboat regulation should be subject to exclu-
sive federal control. Given the strong state interests at stake,
the Tanker Law tug escort requirement would probably have sur-
vived occupation of the field analysis.
4. Size Limitation
The Tanker Law prohibited the entrance into Puget Sound
of "supertankers," that is, tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT.
9 3
Six Justices believed that the size limitation conflicted with the
traffic control provisions of title I and with the design authority
of title II of the PWSA.
94
Despite the traditional rule that state exercise of police power
will not be found preempted unless the "intention of Congress to
1o0 Id. 91.
191 Id. 11.
192 Id. 12.
11)WAsrL. REv. CoDE ANN. § 88.16.190(1) (Supp. 1977).
'94 435 U.S. at 174-78.
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exclude States [is] ...clearly manifested," 195 the Court inferred
that Congress intended to occupy the field of size limitations under
title I of the PWSA. Justice White reasoned that section 1222 (b),
"by permitting the State to impose higher equipment or safety
standards 'for structures only,' impliedly forbids higher state stand-
ards for vessels." 11, Federal authority had been exercised in the
field of "safety standards" only to the extent that the Coast Guard
had imposed a rule of passage for the strait leading to Puget
Sound.197 The Court held that since state standards were stricter
than this federal standard, the Tanker Law size limitation was pre-
empted. 198 Perhaps recognizing the weakness of this reasoning, the
Court fell back on the alternative argument that a size limit is
arguably "similar to or indistinguishable from a design require-
ment," 199 thus importing its arguments from that section. On
either ground, the Court had returned to what amounts to a po-
tential conflict standard.
Finally, the Court held that the Tanker Law size limitation
conflicted with title II design authority because the federal agency
had not promulgated any size limitations.2 0 0 This "'failure ... to
exercise . . . full authority takes on the character of a ruling that
no such regulation is appropriate or approved . . .'." 201 This
reasoning is inconsistent with that adopted by the majority regard-
ing the validity of the tug escort requirement. There the state
regulation was upheld because the federal agency had not exercised
its rulemaking authority.202 Again the Court applied pervasiveness
and conflict standards at odds with those employed earlier in its
opinion.20
3
3
95 Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926).
196 435 U.S. at 174.
197 The rule prohibited passage of more than one 70,000 DWT tanker through
the strait in either direction at any given time; during certain weather conditions the
DWT limit is reduced to 40,000. Id. Underlying the Court's Title I argument is
the assumption that federal authority to set safety standards had been pervasively
exercised.
198 Id. 175. Justices Marshall, Brennan and Rehnquist dissented and argued
that an actual conflict standard should have been applied, and that the Secretary's
rule was not broad enough to constitute pervasive exercise of federal authority. Id.
181-85.
199 Id. 175.
200 Id. 178.
201 Id. (quoting Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board,
330 U.S. 767, 774 (1947)).
2 0 2 See id. 172.
203 The absence of federal size limitations led the court to conclude that federal
authority was preeminant in the size limitation field, while the presence of compre-
hensive federal control in the case of design standards supported its pervasiveness
finding. See note 164 supra & accompanying text.
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No design or traffic system provision of the PWSA expressly ex-
cludes the states from enacting size limitations for their harbors,20°
and the Court's opinion is consistent with the proposed approach
in this regard.
The Court should, however, have acknowledged that no title II
design standard was manifestly incompatible with Washington's
supertanker ban. Nor was there an impossibility of dual compli-
ance with the federal "local navigation rule." The rule only
prohibits passage of more than one 70,000 DWT vessel through the
strait leading to Puget Sound at any given time; during certain
weather conditions the DWT limit is reduced to 40,000.205 Compli-
ance with the supertanker ban would not lead to a violation of the
federal rule. The real issue was whether the federal government
occupied the field to the exclusion of this state requirement.
As in the case of federal design standards, 2 6 the exercise of
federal authority hardly seems complex or comprehensive enough
to warrant a finding of pervasive federal control in the field of
tanker size regulation. The federal local navigation rule only
applied to Rosario Strait and not to Puget Sound as a whole. The
title II design requirements did not explicate size standards and
hence could not alone stand as an all-encompassing framework.
There was, however, the difficult pervasiveness question whether
the federal enrollment and licensing scheme constituted a complex,
comprehensive control of coastwise shipping that should preempt
states from prohibiting harbor entry to classes of tankers. Pursuant
to the rule articulated in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,207 the
validity of the Washington size limitation would turn on whether
it was a "reasonable" environmental protection measure.
Establishing "reasonableness" would have led the court into
application of the dominance standard. The Court should have
decided openly whether the depth and configuration of Puget Sound
2 0 4 See 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iv) (Supp. V 1975); 46 U.S.C. § 391a(l) (Supp.
V 1975). States are allowed, under the statute, to establish higher safety equip-
ment requirements "for [land] structures only." 33 U.S.C. § 1222(b) (Supp. V
1975). The Secretary is authorized to promulgate "minimum design standards."
46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975). In the absence of a provision expressly ex-
cluding state authority, no inference of intention to preempt should be drawn. See
text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
205 435 U.S. at 174.
206 See text accompanying notes 178-79 supra.
207431 U.S. 265, 277 (1977). Douglas held certain Virginia laws prohibiting
commercial fishing in Virginia by non-residents to be preempted by federal law.
At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed the permissibility of reasonable
regulations otherwise within the state's police power. Id. 286-87.
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or the relative safety of supertankers could stand as a reasonable
basis for excluding tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT.20
8
In addition to the federal interest in importation of the least
expensive crude oil,209 the federal policy of stimulating supertanker
construction was also involved.2 10 A finding that the size limitation
tended to "Balkanize" tanker regulation would further weigh in
favor of federal interests. These and other international and do-
mestic federal interests should have been balanced against the
benefits provided by the size limitation to establish whether the
need for uniform national size standards warranted the preemption
of the Washington size limitation. The balancing of these inter-
ests is admittedly a difficult and sensitive task. Nevertheless, it
should have been undertaken frankly, without being hidden behind
inconclusive statutory language and legislative history.
V. CONCLUSION
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.21 the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed the extent to which provisions of Washington's Tanker Law
were in conflict or incompatible with the legitimate exercise of
federal authority. The unpredictable manner in which the Court
applied principles of preemption doctrine is symptomatic of the
type of preemption analysis used by the federal judiciary. By rely-
ing largely on alleged conflicts with congressional intent, where
none was clear, the Court failed to explicate a convincing basis for
finding that Congress had preempted state regulations limiting
tanker size and design.2 12 The Court's analysis provides little guid-
208 There appears to be a good faith dispute as to whether supertankers are
greater risks to the environment than tankers smaller than 125,000 DWT. See 435
U.S. at 176 n.27.
It would appear that Alaska prefers supertankers. See generally Tank Vessel
Traffic Regulation Act, ALASCA STAT. § 30.20.010-.060 (1977).
The Senate Commerce Committee hearings on the PWSA indicated that, while
a small tanker can come to a "crash stop" in one-half of a mile in five minutes,
it takes a 200,000 DWT tanker two and one-half miles and over twenty minutes.
Furthermore, during such "crash stops," the vessel cannot be adequately steered.
It was reported that the propulsion on a 250,000 DWT tanker is equivalent to
that of a one-third horsepower motor on a forty-foot boat. S. RE'., supra note 136,
at 18, [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ai. NEws at 2778.
209 See 435 U.S. at 189 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210 As of January 31, 1976, approximately $197 million had been expended for
the construction of supertankers under the Construction Differential Subsidy Pro-
gram of the Merchant Marine Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1161 (1970). An additional
$314 million is under contract. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 42
n.43, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
211 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
212 See text accompanying notes 176-79 & 205-10 supra.
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ance to state legislatures that desire to optimize environmental pro-
tection without impinging on substantial federal interests.
Nevertheless, a consistent and predictable method of preemp-
tion analysis is possible within the environmental context. Federal
environmental policy is committed to comprehensive environmental
protection through cooperative regulation with the states.213  In
light of this policy and the presumed validity of the exercise of
traditional state police powers, 214 it is sensible to treat federal en-
vironmental standards as minimum standards and presume the
validity of stricter state regulations.215 The unified method of pre-
emption analysis proposed in this Comment 216 combines these
presumptions with a sequential application of traditional preemp-
tion principles. First, the court applies the express preemption
principle: it inquires whether a federal statute expressly excludes
state regulation and vests in the federal government sole authority
to regulate the environmental sub-field.217 If the state legislation
survives the first test the court applies the conflict principle: 218
it inquires whether a party subject to regulation under both regu-
latory schemes is subject to the "impossibility of dual compli-
ance." 219 If dual compliance is possible, the court moves to the
third step and applies the occupation of the field principle.220 The
court first inquires whether federal regulation of the environmental
sub-field is pervasive. Such a finding is possible if the federal gov-
ernment has established a complex scheme of rule promulgation,
implementation and enforcement covering all aspects of the sub-
field.221  If regulation is not pervasive, the court should next in-
quire whether the federal interests dominate the specific area so as
to exclude state regulation. 2 2  This entails a conscientious itemi-
zation of the federal interests adversely affected by the state regula-
tion and the interests peculiar to the state which are served by it.
The court should evaluate the relative strength of these interests
and determine if i) the federal interests have national significance,
ii) the federal interests clearly predominate over those served by
218 See text accompanying notes 64-78 supra.
2 14 See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
215 See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
216 See text accompanying notes 96-122 supra.
217 See text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
2 18 See text accompanying notes 108-13 supra.
219 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
22 0 See text accompanying notes 115-22 supra.
221 See text accompanying note 117 supra.
222 See text accompanying note 119 supra.
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the state legislation, and iii) the nature of federal involvement in
the field requires uniform standards.
State environmental legislation that survives application of ex-
press preemption, conflict and occupation of the field principles
should be held not preempted by the exercise of federal authority.
Such legislation will protect local interests as defined by the state
without impinging upon the effectiveness of the federal government.
If the courts were to employ a method of preemption analysis
such as that outlined above, preemption analysis would be consid-
erably more rational and predictable. In the environmental con-
text, this should contribute to the achievement of optimum pro-
tection of both federal and state interests. Moreover, it should
improve the often uneasy relationship between the states and the
federal government.
